Northwestern University School of Law

Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons
Faculty Working Papers

2009

The Foreclosure Crisis and the Anti-Fragmentation
Principle in State Property Law
David A. Dana
Northwestern University School of Law, d-dana@law.northwestern.edu

Repository Citation
Dana, David A., "The Foreclosure Crisis and the Anti-Fragmentation Principle in State Property Law" (2009). Faculty Working Papers.
Paper 186.
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/facultyworkingpapers/186

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Working Papers by an authorized administrator of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

DRAFT -- PLEASE DO NOT
CITE OR QUOTE WITHOUT
AUTHOR'S PERMISSION

The Foreclosure Crisis and the Anti-Fragmentation Principle in State Property Law
David A. Dana1

One of every ten houses in the United States is likely to burn down. Figuratively,
that is. These houses are "owned" by someone who has been or is at real risk of being
foreclosed upon by the servicer of a mortgage on his home.2 Moreover, one in five
homeowners in the United States will likely to be "under water" before housing prices
bottom -- that is, the market value of the home will be less than the amount borrowed
with the house as collateral.3 These foreclosures, in turn, are wreaking havoc even on
neighbors whose mortgages are not in default, just as fire in a one house can easily
damage the house next door. Foreclosures are driving down housing prices for nonforeclosed-upon properties, and leaving unoccupied, uncared-for properties that invite
vandalism and criminal activity. And, of course, there are very high social costs from the
dislocation of families from their homes.
The measures that state and localities have so far tried to stem the foreclosure
crisis are very unlikely to work. Cities have threatened to bring or have brought public
nuisance claims against lenders who allegedly made loans to borrowers they knew could
not pay and/or did not understand the risks they were assuming. As have states in past
credit crises, states have also looked to foreclosure moratoria as a means of slowing
dislocations and encouraging loan modifications. Neither of these measures will yield
much more than publicity for the plight of communities engulfed in foreclosures.
To effectively address the foreclosure crisis, legislation is needed that will address
a major reason that servicers have resisted making effective loan modifications that could
keep at least some struggling borrowers in their homes. That reason is the excessive legal
fragmentation of individual mortgages. By virtue of the revolution in the mortgage
industry and mortgage markets in just the last few decades, a range of parties often have a
some kind of "right" and/or economic stake in the secured credit on any given home.
These parties have conflicting interests, and as a result servicers are unwilling or unable
to re-work loans in cases where borrowers can and would make reasonable payments
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(that is, payments that take some account of the dramatic drop in housing values). In
effect, "we" -- our society, that is -- has made with mortgages the same mistake that
feudal society made with respect to property in land: allowing private parties to divide up
a key kind of property in so many ways and so intricately that the transaction costs are
just too high for rational, timely decisions to be made about the property when conditions
change. The current mortgage crisis is an incarnation of what might be called "the feudal
mistake."4
There is a possible solution, and it necessarily must be both legislative and
federal. Congress should enact legislation that removes the loan modification process
from the current servicers and vests it in neutral, economically disinterested agents who
will make loan modification decisions as if -- using the criteria that would be used if -they owned all the interests in the individual mortgages at risk. The states cannot
undertake this reform, but state law, and in particular the common law of property, can
provide historical legitimacy for any such federal effort. State law reflects an antifragmentation-of-interest principle in the form of the rule against perpetuities, and in
other rules of deed and will construction. State oil and gas field unitization laws have
operated in accord with such an anti-fragmentation principle as well. The property law
tradition of legal interventions to combat excessive fragmentation also bolsters the
argument that federal legislation transferring servicing of mortgages would not be a
taking under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
This Article is organized as follows. Part One briefly evaluates public nuisance
litigation as a response to the foreclosure crisis, and temporary mortgage moratoria. Part
Two explains how the changes in the mortgage industry have impeded significant efforts
to modify loans in a way that actually would leave borrowers able and willing to maintain
payments on the modified loans, rather than simply re-defaulting. It also outlines the
proposal to re-structure the servicing of troubled loans by making modification decisions
replicate what one might expect to be the decisions that would be made in the absence of
excessive fragmentation. Part Three develops the argument that Anglo-American
property law reflects an anti-fragmentation principle. Part Four outlines the argument that
dramatic federal intervention to address excessive fragmentation of property in mortgages
would not constitute a regulatory taking.
I. State Measures That Will Not Work
A. Public Nuisance Suits
One possible response to the foreclosure crisis would be for hard-hit cities and
states to seek financial recovery from the originators, securitizers, and investors in
mortgages and then use the recovered money to help homeowners and others, as well as
to meet the property tax shortfall and other budgetary problems arising from the housing
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crisis. Cleveland is pursuing this strategy aggressively.5 The most immediate problem for
these lawsuits is that they lack a workable legal theory. It appears there was some
actionable fraud in mortgage origination in Cleveland and elsewhere, but fraud is hard to
prove and many of the deepest pockets in these lawsuits are far too removed from the
mortgage brokers and originators to be able to be legally responsible for fraudulent
representations made to mortgage applicants. As a result, Cleveland has grounded its suit
in public nuisance, a category of tort for which no showing of intent is required.
Characterizing the origination, securitization, and investment in mortgages as
public nuisance, however, stretches "public nuisance" beyond what even what a
sympathetic court would (or I think, should) allow. Because public nuisance is a strict
liability tort, in the sense that it does not require a showing of bad intent or lack of due
care, courts have resisted efforts to re-cast products liability law as a form of public
nuisance law,6 and for the same reason they would be reluctant to re-cast consumer fraud
and securities fraud as a form of public nuisance. Federal preemption is also a problem
for these public nuisance claims against national or federal or international financial
actors. Finally, even public nuisance claims necessitate a showing of causation, and the
causes of mortgage defaults and foreclosures are certainly multi-factored. The common
law places on the plaintiff in a public nuisance suit the very daunting burden of showing
that the mortgage originator, servicer or investor is the but-for "cause" of a default and
foreclosure.
B. Mortgage Moratoria
States traditionally have set the procedures and substantive standards regarding
mortgage foreclosure as part of their general role as the source of real property law. For
example, state law governs how foreclosure sales must be conducted, how much time a
defaulting borrower has to repurchase his foreclosed-upon home as a matter of right after
the foreclosure sale, and to what extent defaulting homeowners can be held liable for
deficiencies between the outstanding principal owed and the foreclosure proceeds.
Building on this traditional role, states have sometimes responded to economic
crises by attempting to alter the foreclosure rules and standards to help borrowers in
trouble. Prior to the current foreclosure crisis, the two most notable waves of state-law
foreclosure relief occurred during the Great Depression and the farm crisis of the 1980s.
In both cases, the states opted for temporary moratoria on mortgage foreclosures, and
sometimes they instituted successive moratoria.
States have responded to the current foreclosure crisis with moratoria, and, as is
often true, California has been at the vanguard. California adopted a statute that uses the
5
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stick of a moratorium to incentivize banks to modify loans. Under the California
Foreclosure Prevention Act, banks are required to delay foreclosure actions by ninety
days unless they adopt a comprehensive loan modification program that includes such
measures as interest rate reductions and deferral or reduction of principal.7
The states, however, face substantial legal obstacles in pursuing a strategy of
increasing the costs of foreclosure as a means of pressuring lenders to engage in more
and/or more generous loan modification. For one thing, states are preempted from
regulating national banks or their affiliates, and a large share of the mortgages in every
state have been originated or partly held or serviced by such institutions.8 The California
legislation specifically states that California is not seeking to exercise oversight or
inspection authority over national banks or affiliates, but pressuring banks to engage in
loan modifications may be categorized more as loan and capital regulation (the exclusive
domain of the federal government, with respect to national banks and their affiliates) than
property law and contract law (traditionally, and still largely, the domain of the states
even with respect to national banks and their affiliates).
The federal constitution also poses a potential obstacle to state moratoria. In
Home Building & Loan Ass'n v Blaisdell, the United States Supreme Court upheld a
foreclosure relief statute enacted by Minnesota against constitutional challenge under the
Contracts Clause, explaining that the protections afforded defaulting homeowners were
temporary and justified by an economic emergency.9 And much more recently, the Court
upheld a temporary moratorium on construction in the Lake Tahoe region on the theory
that local regulators needed flexibility in developing the best means of reconciling private
property owners' interests and the need to prevent environmental degradation.10 These
precedents might suggest that California and other states have leeway under the federal
constitution to institute temporary moratoria as long as such moratoria are styled as
temporary and do not de facto become long-term or semi-permanent.
But that is exactly the problem: truly temporary moratoria will accomplish
nothing or next to nothing. Of course, moratoria could sometimes be helpful while other
significant reforms are being put in place.11 However, the pressure and costs of delay in
foreclosure due to moratoria, by themselves, are not enough to overcome the obstacles to
meaningful loan modifications, including the conflicting interests among interest holders
in mortgages. And, at the end of the moratoria, borrowers therefore will just face more
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late payments and penalties than before the moratoria. As a result, we are likely to
observe a wave of foreclosures once state moratoria end.12
II. Excessive Fragmentation as a Cause of the Mortgage Crisis, and What to Do
About It
A. Too Many Players, Too Many Conflicts
In the "old days" of residential mortgage financing, the relevant players with
respect to the secured credit on a home were simply "the bank" and "the borrower." The
bank originated the mortgage, serviced it, and owned it. The borrower paid principal and
interest to the bank, and that was that. In this regime, the bank would modify a loan in
trouble if it reasonably could predict that the stream of payments the borrower could
make under a modified loan would yield more net profit (or less net loss) than would
result from foreclosure. In this regime, a bank rationally would agree to significant loan
modification, even principal reduction, in order to avoid foreclosure where housing prices
had dropped substantially since the origination of the mortgage.
That has all changed. Now, with respect to the secured credit on a single home,
there is a host of actors with an economic interest in whether or how the loan is paid back
and/or modified. Mortgages now are most often serviced by an entity that holds no direct
or indirect interest in the mortgage or mortgages on the property. Moreover, a large
percentage of first mortgages in the United States in recent years have been pooled, and
each pool has been securitized. The securities in each pool have been divided into
different "tranches" with different credit/risk ratings and different rights to payments
from the borrowers. Tranching has occurred in a dizzying variety of approaches, but
typically, for each pool, there are senior, intermediate or mezzanine, and junior tranches.
The lower tranches, moreover, typically have been re-securitized through the use of
collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOS) and/or collateralized debt obligations
(CDOs). CMOs and CDOs then often have been tranched and securitized in the form of
CMO2s or CDO2s, and then sometimes these instruments in turn have been tranched and
securitized, and on and on.13 By virtue of the financial alchemy of Wall Street, a single
mortgage could -- and often has been -- transformed into tens or hundred or even
thousands of distinct investment interests.
Still, there are even more interest holders to consider. At least in theory, in some
cases there could be a surplus value after all the various bondholders in a pool have been
paid off. This residual interest was also carved out and sold to yet another set of entities,
called residual claimants of holders of Net Interest Margin or NIM. And on top of all of
12
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this, Wall Street created a layer of credit default swaps, which are insurance-bet
investments based on mortgage pool investments.
Finally, for many properties, a second mortgage was originated at the same time
as the first mortgage in order to allow borrowers to avoid mortgage insurance
requirements. (Second mortgages also often are originated at a later date, often as part of
a home equity line.) These second mortgages have became much more common in
mortgages originated after 2002; by 2006, more than half of Alt-A mortgage originations
also included a second mortgage.14 These second mortgages often are held by parties
other than these who hold first mortgages or interests in the securitized or multiplysecuritized pools containing the first mortgage. And to make matters all the more
difficult, second mortgages are often securitized and re-securitized in the same iterative
process as first mortgages.
This incredible fragmentation of the secured credit in individual homes impedes
effective loan modification for three basic reasons: (1) servicers have distinctive
economic interests regarding the mortgages they service that makes them resist effective
modifications; (2) even when servicers would pursue an effective modification of a
mortgage that is part of a securitized pool, they cannot obtain the necessary agreement of
all of the owners of a direct or indirect interest in the mortgage; and (3) even when
servicers would pursue an effective modification of a first mortgage that is part of a
securitized pool, and can obtain the consent of everyone who has an interest in that
mortgage, they cannot coordinate the necessary subordination of the second mortgage on
the property.
Servicers service mortgages contained in a securitized pool by virtue of contracts
known as Pooled Servicer Agreements (PSAs). Because the servicer of a mortgage does
not own any part of the mortgages it services, its only source of revenue related to the
mortgages is a fee it obtains from investors in the pool of securitized mortgages, and
these fees are generally based on the principal of the serviced mortgages. Servicers thus
have a strong interest in not modifying loans in such a way as to reduce principal and
hence reduce fees, even when doing so might be the only way to avoid foreclosures and
might be exactly what an economically rational servicer would do if they also owned the
mortgages they serviced.15 Because PSA contracts also generally provide that servicers
must cover payments to investors in the mortgage pool after the mortgages go into default
and up until the properties are foreclosed upon, cash-strapped servicers also have an
incentive to push mortgages in default to foreclosure. The fact that servicers are
compensated for all expenses of foreclosure, including whatever various fees they tack
on, also may lead them to proceed readily to foreclosure.16
14
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Even when servicers want to aggressively pursue meaningful loan modifications,
including ones involving principal, the inability to coordinate and obtain consent from all
the relevant investors may result in paralysis or at best halfway measures. Many PSA
contract require a supermajority or even unanimous consent of all interest holders in a
mortgage in order to allow a modification of the loan. Even when that is not the case,
servicers reasonably may fear liability if they act without broad consent. Investors in
senior-most tranches have no reason to support loan modification because they have
priority and will recover on their investment even with foreclosure, while those in the
most junior tranches have no reason to support modification because they will receive
nothing once a schedule of significantly reduced payment is in place. Of course, some "in
the middle" investors may benefit from meaningful modifications but that hardly makes
for unanimity or a supermajority of investors.17
Re-working the first mortgage, moreover, will not happen (and cannot prevent
foreclosures) if all of the benefits of the re-working accrue to second mortgage holders,
rather than borrowers. As the Congressional Oversight Panel's Report on the Foreclosure
Crisis explained, "Unless a junior mortgage consents to subordination, the junior
mortgage moves up in seniority upon refinancing. Out of money junior mortgagees will
consent to subordination only if they are paid. Thus, junior mortgages pose a serious
holdup for refinancing, demanding a ransom in order to permit a refinancing to
proceed."18 Where the second mortgage has been securitized, gaining consent to
securitization may mean in effect gaining the consent of hundred or thousands of
investors in a pool that contains the second or junior mortgage.
The fragmentation of the secured credit interest in real property described above
is, to be sure, not the only impediment to meaningful and expeditious loan modifications.
There are many other reasons, ranging from widespread job losses to concerns of
publically traded financial institutions about booking losses when principal is reduced to
the sheer numbers of mortgages in default or facing default.19 But fragmentation appears
to be an important enough part of the story that addressing fragmentation must be part of
the solution.
B. Putting The Pieces Back Together
Government-provided financial incentives for servicers to modify loans, in
theory, could operate to counteract their financial incentives not to engage in meaningful
principal reductions and/or to press for mortgages in default to go into foreclosure. But
such incentives would need to be structured and calibrated properly for each major
servicer, and so far there is no evidence yet that government actors have the information
or political ability or desire to provide the needed incentives. Loan modifications have
increased somewhat with the federal incentives for servicers that have been instituted, but
the available evidence suggests that many of these modifications are "bad" ones that
17
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result in the servicers receiving incentive payments but that do not modify the loans in
such a way that borrowers can (or, as a matter o pure self-interest should) continue to
make payments rather than re-defaulting and walking away from their mortgages in the
relatively near term.20 Moreover, giving servicers incentive payments will not correct the
barriers to meaningful re-working of mortgages that are rooted in the difficulty of
coordinating and obtaining consent from the multiple investors who have conflicting
stakes in particular properties that have been subject to a securitized first mortgage and
(often) also a second junior mortgage or mortgages.
Lauren Willis and Howell Jackson, writing separately, have suggested that the
federal government cut through the mortgage securitization morass by condemning all
the interests in securitized mortgages.21 Such a vast exercise of the eminent domain
power could easily be tied up in the courts, with the salient questions being what just
compensation was at the time of condemnation and whether it was paid. Moreover, as
the party bringing the condemnation actions, the government would bear the burden of
proving that it paid just compensation; given the uncertainties of valuation, it matters a
great deal which party has the burden of proof. Even if there were no legal challenges,
moreover, the federal government could not plausibly attempt valuations and hence
pursue condemnations until it had assembled information about each mortgage and
borrower and mortgage pool, which is something that would require changes in federal
law. As discussed below, once so much information had been gathered, effective reforms
could be undertaken without the further step of actual condemnation of mortgages and
interests in mortgages. Further, wholesale condemnation of mortgages and interest in
mortgage pools would mean that the federal government effectively owned the mortgages
on a huge number of homes and either would remain the nation's largest mortgagee or
would have to undertake the enormous task of re-marketing mortgages in a way that did
not unduly benefit some private parties or otherwise de-legitimate the government. Our
politics and political culture would almost certainly make such a massive federal
intervention in the market impossible, and we need not go to that extreme in order to
address the excessive fragmentation in property in mortgages.
A better approach has been outlined by John Geneakoplos and Susan Koniak.22
In this approach, the servicing of securitized first mortgages on homes would be
transferred to government-appointed trustees who would be empowered to obtain, for
each mortgage, the necessary information to determine whether the mortgage was at risk
20

See OCC and OTS Mortgage Metrics Report, Fourth Quarter 2008, at 6 (finding that the majority of loan
modifications did not decrease borrower's monthly payments and 32 percent increased monthly payments.
The report also found that modifications that left payments the same or increased them were associated
with re-default rates that were double that associated with modifications that reduced monthly payments.
Id, at 6-7.
21
See Lauren E. Willis, Stabilize Home Mortgage Borrowers, and the Financial System Will Follow,
Loyola Law Legal Studies Paper 2008-28, available at ssrn.com; Howell E. Jackson, Build a Better Bailout,
Christian Science Monitor (Sept. 25, 2008), available at www.csmonitor.com.
22
See John D. Geanakoplos & Susan P. Koniak, Mortgage Justice Is Blind, NEW YORK TIMES, October
29, 2008, and Matters of Principal, NEW YORK TIMES, March 4, 2009. I am also relying on an outline
of a "Mortgage and Securities Stabilization, Recovery and Modification Program Act of 2009" based on the
Geanakoplos and Koniak proposal and authored by them as well George Cohen (on file with author).

8

of foreclosure absent modification of the loan terms. In cases where the answer is found
to be yes, the trustees could modify the loan (including via principal reductions), but only
if doing so would reasonably be expected to yield more revenue than foreclosure. A
homeowner would need to be able to demonstrate that he or she could reasonably be
expected to make and sustain the payments on the modified loan. Mortgages that did not
meet the test for modification would be allowed to proceed to foreclosure.23
In order to capitalize on the traditional knowledge that informed lending and loan
modifications before the dawning of the age of excessive fragmentation in property in
mortgages, the plan would employ community bankers on a de-centralized, regional
approach. While the community-based bankers would be sighted with respect to local
economic conditions and borrowers' personal profiles and histories, they would be
"blind" as to who or what institutions held interests in any of the mortgages they were
reviewing. After the blind review, mortgages that have not been re-worked and those that
have would be "returned" to the original servicers. Throughout this process, investors in
mortgage pools would be paid as before, except that their payments might be adjusted or
even terminated on mortgages that had been modified.24
The blind trustee plan, in the case of any given mortgage, might result in some
unhappy investors. But under this plan, the federal government would not need to
institute condemnations suits and calculate and defend particular just compensation
payments: investors would need to file inverse condemnation or regulatory takings suits
and would have the burden of overcoming the ripeness requirements for regulatory
takings challenges before even being able to address and argue the merits that regulatory
takings had occurred.25 And (as discussed below) with certain modifications, the plan
would very likely survive any regulatory takings challenges, such that the thorny issue of
just compensation could be avoided, completely.

23
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III. The Anti-Fragmentation Principle in Anglo-American Law, and Its Significance
for Federal Legislative Reform
A plan to transfer the servicing of securitized mortgages to blind government
trustees would represent a very significant alteration by the federal government of a
private ordering through the means of property and contract. But significant alterations
are not without precedent. Perhaps most notably, President Roosevelt removed the
United from the gold standard during the Great Depression, and in effect altered
thousands of contracts based on the premise of a gold standard; the United States
Supreme Court, apparently without effort or reservation, accepted that elimination of the
gold standard as constitutional.26 But the gold standard example has nothing to do with
excessive fragmentation; it is not evidence of our legal culture's willingness to affirm
public re-orderings of private orderings so as to reduce or eliminate the negative effects
of excessive fragmentation. In the following discussion I focus on examples that do
suggest an anti-fragmentation principle or tradition in our property law.27
The Law of Estates in Land
The disposition of property through wills is a regime of private ordering, but the
law has trumped and/or constrained private ordering to prevent excessive fragmentation
of property interests in land by means of wills or other grants. There is no "antifragmentation principle" as such in our estate law tradition, but there are a number of
doctrines that have been justified on the basis of enhancing the alienability and especially
efficient market alienability of land. These doctrines enhance alienability precisely by
limiting fragmentation of interests in land. The implicit premise of these doctrines -- as
they have come to be justified, however obscure and contested their historical origins
may be -- is that private actors may not splinter property into so many fragments that they
preclude value-maximizing decision-making regarding the use and disposition of land.
The first such doctrine is that ambiguous grants or devises should be read as
creating a fee simple in land. The "fee simple" is the least fragmented of the recognized
English (and later American) estates in land, because it combines all current possessory
rights in land with all future rights; as the least fragmented estate in land, the fee simple is
the estate in land that most facilitates investment in and market alienability of property in
land. The fee simple had developed out of far-more-temporally-fragmented interests by
the Fourteenth Century, but the presumption with respect to ambiguous grants was that a
life estate rather than a fee simply was what the grantor/testator intended to create. In the
United States, in the Nineteenth Century, the presumption was changed by statute, so that
ambiguous grants would be construed as creating not a life estate, but the lessfragmented, more alienable fee simple.28 The preference for a fee simple can also be seen
26
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in the adoption of statutes in many of the states (beginning in the Revolutionary era) that
abolished the fee tail -- an interest where land is tied up along lines of biological issue or
"heirs of my body" -- and that re-wrote grants containing traditional fee tail language as
creating fee simples.29
Another doctrine that is consistent with an anti-fragmentation principle is the
doctrine of worthier title. This doctrine addresses situations where a grantor during his or
her life gives property to someone for life (a life estate) and then to the grantor's legal
heirs in succession (who would not be known necessarily at the time of the grant). Such
grants fragment the interest in land over time, creating many possible interest holders,
and make market alienation and investment in the land difficult.30 Under the doctrine of
worthier title, the grants are re-written to provide that the life tenant has possessory rights
of the land during his or her life, but after death, all the rights in the land revert back to
the grantor, and he or she has a fee simple. By facilitating the re-consolidation of the land
into a fee simple held by the grantor or the grantor's estate, the doctrine decreased
fragmentation and increased market alienability. Although the doctrine of worthier title is
now understood as a doctrine of interpretation where the grantor's intent is ambiguous, it
was initially adopted and followed in this country as a mandatory rule that applied even
when it contradicted the clear intent of the grantor.
The final estate doctrine that advances an anti-fragmentation principle is the
common law rule against perpetuities. This rule operates to override even a clear
expression of intent on the part of the grantor when the grant fragments the interest in
property so as to create distant, uncertain contingent remainders. Interests that violate the
rule are simply "crossed out", with the result that the overall fragmentation of property in
land is reduced and alienability increased. As John Chipman Gary explained in a classic
treatise, "The principal object of the Rule against perpetuities is to prevent, except within
certain limits, restraints upon the alienation of property by the owner of the present
interest."31
Statutory Unitization of Underground Oil and Gas Fields
State property law, via statutes, has expressed an anti-fragmentation principle
most clearly in the context of oil and gas field development. Indeed, in this arena, the
law has overridden firm property rights expectations and contracts in the name of
preventing a socially important asset from being inefficiently developed. The state and
federal courts, in this context, have accepted that where existing property rights rules and
private ordering result in too many parties with an interest in the same resource, the law
has a legitimate role in coercing the multiple interest holders to act in a more unified, and
hence (from an overall return on private investment perspective) rational, manner.
29

Dukeminier & Krier, PROPERTY, 6th ed, at 188-189. Where the fee tail was reformed rather abolished,
it was done so to improve transparency as to who held an interest and the property and hence enhance
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30
Dukeminier & Krier, PROPERTY, 6th ed, at 244 ("The reasons for this doctrine are obscure, but
probably it was motivated by [the idea that] [t]he doctrine furthers alienability").
31
Roland Gray, ed., JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY'S THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (4th ed.), at 496.
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Oil and gas fields are underground resources that typically can be drained from
any of a number of surface wells. Where the surface area is held by multiple landowners,
the physical reality of oil and gas -- that it flows and hence can be forced to migrate in
one direction or another with enough technological investment -- creates a dynamic
where neighboring landowners engage in a race to drain the entire field, each acting out
of fear that delay may result in his neighbors getting all the oil or gas. Under the
traditional rule of capture, as embodied in state statutes and common law precedents,
each surface owner owned whatever oil or gas he or she managed to withdraw.
In every major oil and natural gas producing state in the United States except
Texas, the overinvestment in drilling equipment and surface storage of oil (rather than
conservation by means of leaving it underground)32 led the state legislature and/or an
authorized state agency to adopt some scheme of mandatory oil and/or natural gas field
unitization. The typical unitization scheme overrode any previous contractual
arrangements between some or all of the neighboring landowners and/or lessees and
required that the field be managed as a single unit and that the costs and profits from the
development of the unitary field be distributed to individual surface landowners in
proportion to the size of their surface land holding.
Aggrieved landowners brought many constitutional challenges to state oil and gas
field unitization statutes, arguing that they effected unconstitutional takings of private
property rights and impairments of private contracts. These challenges all failed33: the
state courts repeatedly affirmed unitization as a rational state response to the wasting of
the value of the oil and gas resource. For example, in Palmer Oil, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court upheld a unitization statute that allowed for mandatory unitization when
the holders of fifty percent or more of the surface area of the field petitioned for
compulsory unitization. The statute was based on a legislative finding that "it is desirable
and necessary . . . to authorize and provide for unitized management, operation and
further development of [oil and gas field properties] . . . to the end that a greater ultimate
recovery of oil and gas may be had therefrom, waste prevented, and the correlative rights
of the owners in a fuller and more beneficial enjoyment of the oil and gas rights,
protected."34 The United States Supreme Court has also rejected constitutional
challenges to unitization, explaining that "a state has constitutional power to regulate
production of oil and gas so as to prevent waste and to secure equitable apportionment
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among landholders of the migratory oil and gas under their land, fairly distributing
among them the costs of production and of apportionment."35
Mortgages and mortgage pools and mortgage pool-insurance instruments are not
the same thing as wills or oil or gas fields; the analogy between the anti-fragmentation
precedents in the law of estates in land and in oil and gas unitization can only be taken so
far. Indeed, one could read the estate law examples as artifacts of a particular concern
with avoiding family dynasties and the oil and gas precedents as a manifestation of an
undercurrent in American law that key natural resources can be privately held but also are
a subject of distinctive public interest and control.
Law, however, evolves based on analogies, and analogies are never perfect. In the
estates in land examples and in field unitization, fragmentation of property interests was
viewed as causing inefficiencies and waste, and the law was applied to reduce
fragmentation, despite that doing so disrupted private ordering and despite the fact that
there were some relative winners and losers after the law addressed the problem of
fragmentation. One could argue that all the private interests in oil and gas fields benefit
from unitization in the very long run, but we would not have witnessed repeated litigation
challenges if that view were shared by all the affected interest holders. Viewed at a
significant but reasonable level of abstraction, the estate in land and field unitization
examples provide precedential support for the sort of federal legislation that would be
needed to mandate transfers of servicing of mortgages to government trustees.

IV. Would Overcoming Excessive Fragmentation By Transferring Servicing Be a
Taking?
If the federal government were to require that servicing of mortgages be
transferred to blind trustees and some such mortgages consequently modified, would the
government be held liable for having taken private property without just compensation?
Under the applicable ripeness rules, "as-applied" regulatory takings challenges could only
be brought by particular interest holders once it was clear how the government program
had treated or disposed of their interests. But even so, the courts ultimately could be
faced with a large number of ripe taking challenges. What would the result be?
The United States Supreme Court would be the ultimate decisionmaker, and,
formal doctrinal tests aside, four factors appear to drive the Court's regulatory takings
outcomes. First, the Court is far less deferential to uncompensated regulation in the
context of real property regulation than it is in the context of personal property
regulation. Second, the Court seems to be guided in regulatory takings cases by how
important it considers the purpose and content of the regulation at issue, and whether the
regulation reasonably addresses what the Court understands as a kind of public harm (as
opposed to public benefit). Third, the Court seems more concerned about uncompensated
regulation that "picks on" a single or few or small group of property owners, as opposed
to a relatively broad class of citizens. Finally, the Court appears to be willing to find a
35
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regulatory taking only when there has been an interference with the right to exclude from
real property or when the regulation wipes out the economic value and/or viable use of
the property at issue.36
All of these factors suggest that the mandatory transfer of servicing of mortgages
to government trustees would not be deemed to effect regulatory takings -- particularly, if
some minimal payment were made to any interests formally cancelled or terminated as a
result of loan modifications. Consider the first factor -- whether the affected interest are
real property interests. Mortgages and even securities or insurance on securities based on
a pool of mortgages in a sense relate to individual pieces of land. But these interests are
not interest in land in the same emotional and cultural way as the interest of the
homeowners in Nollan and or the hardware store owner in Dolan or the would-be
homeowner and developer in Lucas.37 If it makes any sense at all to privilege property in
land for purposes of regulatory takings analysis, it is because we think "owning" a home
or a farm or small store involves special values and deserves special protection: when we
think of such owning, we do not think of owning financial instruments such as
derivatives. And, of course, private servicers (mostly banks) -- the group that might
complain the most about the transfer of servicing to government trustees --- have no
ownership interest in the underlying parcels of land that would be at issue.38
Saving people's homes from foreclosure that should be -- and, but for excessive
fragmentation, would be -- saved through reasonable modifications is an important public
purpose. Certainly, it is not hard to document that foreclosures have adverse impacts on
whole communities and not just defaulting mortgagors. Moreover, there is precedent for
recognizing the legitimate role of the federal government in providing foreclosure relief
during times of economic upheaval.39 And, as discussed above, there are precedents for
legal interventions to prevent inefficiencies that would result from excessive
fragmentation of property interests.
Third, as a broad-based program that applies the same review and procedure to all
mortgages and that (one would guess) will result in a significant number of loan
modifications, a government trustee-as-servicing program cannot be understood as
picking favorites or otherwise raising the equal protection concerns that seem to underlie
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much of the judicial and academic discourse regarding the law of regulatory takings.40
The government trustee program is closer to broad-based consumer banking regulation or
income tax regulation -- kinds of regulation that has never been held to effect regulatory
takings -- than it is to the kind of narrowly focused land use prohibitions that have
resulted in findings of regulatory takings.
Fourth, the program would not result in wipeouts. To be sure, when loans are
modified to reduce principal and interest, junior tranche interest holders in first mortgage
securitized pools may be left without any possibility that they will receive revenue on the
basis of the modified loans. But if a given mortgage in a pool is troubled enough to meet
the test for modification, the junior tranche interest holders should have no reasonable
expectation of actually collecting any revenue even before the loan is modified.
Moreover, if the relevant property interest for constitutional purposes is deemed to be the
mortgage pool and not the particular sub-set of mortgages within the pool for which the
loan terms are modified,41 it seems likely that the investor in even very junior tranches
will not be deprived of the entire value of his or her property interest.
In addition, by stabilizing the residential real estate market generally, the
government trustee plan would benefit junior tranche investors by reducing the likelihood
of future default on other mortgages in the pool. The government trustee program thus
offers even junior tranche investors something akin to the "average reciprocity of
advantage" the Supreme Court invoked in Penn Central.42 Second mortgage holders also
should benefit from the stabilization of the housing market, inasmuch as they have a
strong stake in preventing current mortgages from entering default and being foreclosed
upon (in which case they recover nothing, given the drop already experienced in housing
prices).
The argument that the government trustee program would not effect total
wipeouts, however, would be strengthened if there were some mechanism by which the
junior tranche interest holders and the holders of second mortgages would receive some
payout when loans are modified. To return to oil and gas field unitization, even holders
of small surface area who likely could not have out-drilled their neighbors do receive a
proportionate share of proceeds from the field once it is managed as a single production
unit. Following this analogy, a government servicing program might provide as follows:
when government trustees modify loans, they must try to quantify the expected gain in
doing so as compared to allowing foreclosure to continue, and then they must direct a
small percentage of the gain (set by a statutory or regulatory formula) to junior tranche
40
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interest holders and/or holders of second mortgages. For example, a flat one percent of
savings-over-foreclosure could be reserved for second mortgagees.43
V. Going Forward
Whatever is done or not done about the crisis related to current mortgages, the
question remains what, if anything, should be done to avoid another round of overfragmentation of mortgages in the future? How can we avoid another foreclosure crisis
prompted or at least lengthened and deepened by such over-fragmentation? There are at
least three general strategies that might be pursued, which I will label: better contracts,
fighting fragmentation with more fragmentation, and reducing fragmentation.
The "better contracts" strategy refers to PSA contracts. One could imagine a
model contract or agreement that allows loan modifications even without any explicit
investor consent if certain conditions and that specifically authorizes or even requires
principal modifications under certain specified circumstances where they would be
sensible -- that is, when there have been widespread and substantial reductions in
housing values. A model agreements also could include fee structures that did not create
incentives (or as great incentives, at least) for servicers to either allow foreclosure where
foreclosure could and should be avoided and to avoid principal-reduction modifications
when those would be the only modifications that plausibly could succeed. Use of the
model PSA could be mandated as a matter of state or federal statute, although it is
unclear, to say the least, whether state statutory requirements would withstand federal
preemption challenges. One immediate objection to such a strategy is it might make
investment in mortgage pools less attractive to investors, and hence might increase the
cost of capital for financing mortgages. But if recent experience has taught us anything,
it would seem to be that barriers to loan modifications can accentuate and prolong a
decline in housing value and in that sense, they create much more economic risk for
investors (and all of us) than they prevent.
The fight-fragmentation-with-fragmentation strategy builds on a recognition that
the division between mortgage servicing and ownership creates a strong possibility of
divergence of interests between servicers and investors in mortgages however much PSA
contracts are drafted to align the interests of servicers and investors. As part of this
strategy, mortgage originators might be required to retain a portion or stake in the
individual mortgages they originate, and servicers would be required to retain or acquire
a portion or stake in the mortgages they service. This strategy entails (possibly) more
fragmentation because in add yet another class or classes of entities with fragments of
ownership in particular mortgages, and hence adds addition unwanted complexity to a
market already overwhelmed by complexity. And it may be difficult to calibrate what
percentage or amount of ownership on the part of originators and servicers would be
43
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required to significantly align their incentives with that of the other investors in
mortgages.
The final strategy entails reducing the legally permissible fragmentation in the
mortgage market. One relatively easy way to do this would be to discourage the creation
of second mortgages at the time of the original financing of the house purchase by
prohibiting borrowers to avoid mortgage insurance requirements by mans of taking out a
second mortgage. Other restriction on second mortgages also might be possible. In
addition, financial institutions that originate mortgages could be limited as to the
percentage of those they securitize, and securitization of mortgages itself could be
regulated to limit the degree of tranching and hence the degree of conflicts between
investors in different tranches. Any of these actions would make financing real estate
purchases more expensive, and it would be hard to know ex ante whether the benefits of
these would outweigh the costs. But one thing is certain: we should be thinking about
these tradeoffs and the best institutional design now, rather than waiting passively for the
next housing crisis.
VI. Conclusion
Secured credit in homes has been divided and over-divided and spun into so many
separate interests that economically rational, socially beneficial modifications of loans
are impossible. The mortgage story is a new one but the excessive fragmentation of
property and the creation of waste and inefficiency is not new. And our legal tradition has
an answer, in the form of an anti-fragmentation principle. Consistent with this principle,
government trustees should be authorized to review mortgages and, where modification
would yield greater total return than foreclosure, modify the loans. Blind trustee review,
moreover, can be achieved without formal condemnations of property interests or the
creation of government liability for regulatory takings.
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